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Abstract:  In  this  paper  we  analyse  the  role  of  some  of  
the building  blocks  in  SHA-256.  We  show  that  the  
disturbance correction strategy is applicable to the SHA-256 
architecture and we  prove  that  functions  Σ,  σ  are  vital  
for  the  security  of  SHA-256 by showing that for a variant 
without them it is possible to find  collisions  with  complexity  
264hash  operations.  As a step towards an analysis of the full 
function, we present the results of our experiments on 
Hamming weights of expanded messages for different 
variants of the message expansion and show that there exist 
low-weight expanded messages for XOR-linearised variants. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent results on the practical cryptanalysis of many hash 
functions from the MD family, including MD4, MD5 
[WLF+05,WY05] as well as SHA-0 and SHA-1 [BCJ+05,RO05, 
WYY05b, WYY05a], drew a considerable attention to the 
security of hash functions  and  raised  some  questions  about  the  
security  of  the latest  function  in  this  family,  namely  SHA-
256.  The  first published  independent  analysis  of  the  members  
of  the SHA-2  family   was   done   by   Gilbert  and   Handschuh  
 
 
They know,  there  has  been  no  analysis  of  the  message  
expansion involving σ0and σ1. In this paper we discuss some 
properties of the message expansion and present our results of the 
search for low- weight message differences for various (XOR-
linear) variants of the message expansion. 
 
II. DESCRIPTION OF SHA-256 
 
SHA-256  [Nat02]  is  an  iterated  cryptographic  hash  function 
based  on  a  compression  function  that  updates  the  state  of  
eight 32-bit  chaining  variables  A,..,H  according  to  the  values  of  
16 32-bit  words  M0,...,  M15of  the  message.  The compression 
function consists of 64 identical steps presented in Figure 1. The 
step transformation employs bitwise Boolean functions 
 
Maj (A,B,C) = (AΛB)V(AΛC)V(BΛC) ,  
  Ch (E,F,G) = (EΛF)V(¬EΛG),  
and two S-boxes  
 
Σ0(x) = ROT R2(x) ROT R13(x) ROT R22(x) ,  
Showed  that there exists a 9- step local  collision with probability 
2−66. Later on, this result has been improved by Hawkes, Paddon  
and Rose [HPR04]. They showed how to increase the probability 
to 2−39 using modular differences.   
 
 
In  this  paper  we  investigate  the  limits  of  applying  the 
disturbance-correction strategy that was introduced by Chabaud 
and  Joux  [CJ98]  to  cryptanalyse  SHA-0.  We demonstrate the 
importance of the S-boxes applied in SHA-256.Throughout this 
paper. we use different linearisation models, namely a 
linearisation with respect to the XOR-operation (XOR- linear) 
and  a  linearisation  with  respect  to  modular  addition  (ADD-
linear).  We  start  from  the  analysis  of  an  ADD-linear  variant  
of SHA-256 and derive a differential  characteristic that  produces 
collisions for that linear  model. Next, we present a zero-output 
differential characteristic with probability 2−64 for the hash 
function with the Boolean functions .This proves that the 
application  of  the  functions Σ0, Σ1, σ0, and  σ1 is  crucial  for  the 
security of the original hash function, since they are replaced by 
the  identity  function  in  this  analysis.  In  parallel  to  this  work,  
a different  variant  of  SHA-256  was  analysed  by  Yoshida  and 
Biryukov [YB05].  
 
A better understanding of the impact of these functions on the 
whole design is the next step in the analysis of SHA-256. While 
the influence of Σ0 and Σ1on  the probability  of  single correction 
has  been  studied  well  by  Hawkes  et  al.  [HPR04], as far as 
[GH03]   
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Σ1(x) = ROT R6 (x)    ROT R11(x) ROT R25 (x) , 
 
built  from  word  rotations  to  the  right  (ROT  R)  and  bitwise 
XORs denoted by .The i-th step uses a fixed constant Ki   and the i-th 
word Wi of the expanded message.  
 
The message expansion works as follows.  An input message is 
split into 512-bit message blocks (after padding). A single message 
block will be denoted either as a row vector m Є Z2 or as a vector 
MtЄ Z232 with 0≤i< 16.   
 
During  the  message  expansion,  this  input  is  expanded  into  a 
vector of 64 32-bit words which may be also seen as the 2048-bit 
expanded message row-vector wiЄ Z2512. The words Wi are 
generated from the initial message M according to the following 
formula: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   1 
 
Figure1:  One step of the SHA-256 compression function 
  
If  we  set  N=64,  we  get  standard  SHA-256, taking  a  different 
value  of N  results in a reduced  (or  extended)  variant of it. The 
functions σ0(x)=ROTR7 (x)   ROT R18(x)   SHR3(x)  and 
σ1(x)=ROT R17(x)      ROT R19(x)       SHR10(x)  are  S-boxes 
defined  using  word  rotations to  the  right  (ROT  R)  and  shifts  
to the right (SHR). 
 
III. COMPUTING COLLISIONS FOR AN ADD-LINEAR VARIANT 
OF SHA- 256 
 
In  order  to  analyse  the  usefulness  of  a  disturbance-correction 
strategy  applied  to  the  SHA-2  architecture,  we  investigate  an 
DD-linear variant of SHA-256, where S-boxes are replaced with 
the identity function, act which will be used later on. 
 
 
 
 
 
And by delay a n(s) the same vector truncated to only n first  
elements i.e., 
 
 
 
 
 
LEMMA III.A 
Let W ЄZ232. If Delaya (W) is a result of the expansion using 
the recursive formula (1) with N = 64 + a, then all the vectors 
Delayb64 (W) for 0 ≤ b ≤ a are also results of the expansion 
process (1). 
 
PROOF: Each vector Delay b64(W) consists  of  elements  of  
the  part of a sequence following the recurrence relation, also 
follows the relation. 
σ0= σ1= Σ0= Σ1= id,           (2)  
And Boolean functions are replaced by the addition modulo 232, 
M aj(x, y, z) = Ch(x, y, z) = x + y + z.  (3)  
 
Now the whole function consists only of linear operations with 
respect to the modular addition. If we introduce a difference ∆i= 
Wi 0 − Wi, we can cancel this disturbance by introducing in the 
next 8 steps i + 1,. ., i + 8 the following sequence of corrections  
 
{−4∆i,2∆i,2∆i,4∆i,2∆i,∆i,0,−∆i}             (4)  
 
The whole process of correcting a single disturbance is presented 
in Table 1. In the first 4 steps we use corrections that keep 
differences from influencing register A and later from step i + 4 
we successively cancel differences in the register H.  
 
The next step is to find a disturbance pattern ∆ that follows the 
expansion process and can give raise to a corrective pattern. We 
will  use  an  argument  similar  to  the  one  used  for  finding 
disturbance  patterns  for  SHA-1  [MP05,  RO05,  PRR05]. Let 
us introduce the necessary notation first. For any vector s= [s0,, sl], 
let us denote by Delaya(s) a   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Correcting a single disturbance ∆I introduced in step i  
in an  ADD-linearised variant of SHA-256  
 
Vector constructed by proceeding elements of s by a zero 
elements i.e., 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where I16 stands for the identity matrix and A denotes a matrix of 
the linear transformation producing 16 new words out of 16 old 
ones according to the recurrence relation (1). The following 
theorem fully characterises disturbance patterns for an ADD-
linear variant of SHA-256.  
 
THEOREM   III.B 
 Let ∆M= M0− M be a message difference. The expanded 
difference ∆ = E(∆M) is a valid disturbance vector for an ADD–linear 
variant of SHA-256 if the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
0 = A3[8::16]·∆M,  (6)  
0 = A−1[8::16]·∆M, (7)  
 
where M[a:: b] means a matrix consisting of rows of the matrix 
M from  the a-th row to the b-th row inclusive.  
 
PROOF. The fundamental observation is that each single word ∆ii 
of  the  disturbance  vector  has  to  be  corrected  by  adding  to 
the next  8  words  the  following  differences  defined  by  
Equation (4),  
{−4∆i,2∆i,2∆i,4∆i,2∆i,∆i,0,−∆i}  
 
This shows that the last non-zero disturbance word may appear in 
position 55, because we need eight steps 56,...,63 to correct it. 
thus, the last 8 words of the expanded difference E·∆M have to be  
zero.  Since E is defined by (5), this condition can be written as 
(6).  
 
Now, let us consider the following linear combination of ∆ 
and its delayed versions  
 
C=∆−4 Delay164 (∆)+ 2 Delay264 (∆)+ 2 Delay364 (∆)+ 4  
Delay464 (∆)+2Delay564(∆)+Delay664(∆)−Delay864(∆)    (8) 
 
It  is  easy  to  see  that  each  disturbance  word  ∆I in  C  is 
corrected  by  its  appropriate  multiplicities  appearing  in  the 
next eight positions and coming from the delayed vectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Since the  message  expansion  is  linear,  C  is  the  result  of  the 
expansion  if  and  only  if  all  the  delayed  and  truncated vectors 
Delayb64(∆), 0 ≤ b ≤ 8 are results of the expansion process.   
 
LEMMA3.1 
 
Assures that it is true if Delay8(∆) = [0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,∆0,...,∆63]Tis  
the  result  of  the  (extended,  N= 68) expansion process. We can 
achieve this by taking the first 16 words  and  expanding  them  
forward  according  to  Equation  (1), but  also  by  taking  any  16  
consecutive  words  and  expanding partly  forward  and  partly  
backward.  In our case we select elements 8–23 for the expansion. 
If we index elements of Delay 8(∆) starting  from -8 and split the 
vector into two parts: one  having  negative  and  the  other  one  
having  non-negative indices,  we  can  express  this  requirement  
equivalently  by  the following two conditions:   
 
[·,·,·,·,·,·,·,·,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]T   = A−1· ∆M and   ∆ =E · ∆M. Only  
the  first  condition,  namely  A−1∆M has  to  end  with  8 zeros,  
has  to  be  satisfied,  since  ∆  is  already  the  result  of  an 
expansion. This condition can be written simply in the form of 
Equation (7) what completes the proof. As long as Equations (6) 
and (7) are satisfied, ∆ is a valid disturbance pattern and C is a 
complete differential characteristic corresponding to it.  
 
After obtaining explicit forms of the matrices A3and A−1 (this is 
possible since A is a bijection) we solve the system of 
equations given by (6) and (7) over Z232 and get the following 
result 
 
 
 
  
 
(9) 
This shows that the solution space is just one-dimensional. 
Any multiple of ∆M is also a solution, but since all components 
of the  vector  (9)  have  only  up  to  four most significant  binary 
digits  different  from  zero  (so  they  are  all  of  the form 
ai·228(mod 232) where ai Є{0,...,15},0≤ i< 16), there are only 16 
distinct  disturbance  patterns. using any  of them results in 
collision for ADD-linearised SHA-256 
 
IV. INCORPORATING BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS 
 
Now let us consider a variant of SHA-256 still without S-Boxes, 
but with both Boolean functions Maj and Ch in place. If we 
multiply the basic pattern (9) by 8 (so shift it left by 3 bit 
positions),  we  get  a  disturbance  pattern  ∆∗= E  (8∆M)  that 
has  non-zero  bits  at  the  most  significant  bits  only.  
The most significant bits of ∆∗ are as follows  
 
10000000011010111011100110100110                     (10)  
0000011100101111 1011100000000000 
 
∆∗ is a disturbance pattern that not only follows the 
message  expansion  but  also  allows  us  to  treat  it  as  a 
binary pattern with a relatively low weight of 27.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can approximate both Boolean functions with probability at 
least  ½  assuming that the function produces an output difference  
each time the input difference is non-zero. This approximation 
is shown in Table 2.  
 
Table  2:  Probabilities  of  non-zero  output  differences  for  the 
Boolean functions Ch and M aj  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
we  use  this  approximation  and  trace  how  a  single  bit 
disturbance  ∆∗I   introduced  in  step  i  propagates  through the  
next  8  steps,  we  get  the  following  sequence  of corrections:  
{0,0,∆i,∆i,0,0,0,∆i},              (11) 
 
Which we need in steps i +1,...,i+8 in order to cancel the initial 
disturbance ∆i. The whole process is very similar to the one used 
to obtain the sequence of corrections (as given in (4)).  
 
A  complete  differential  is  obtained  in  the  same  way  as  in  
the previous case, by adding delayed disturbance patterns 
multiplied by corresponding coefficients of Equation (11),  i.e. 
{0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1}  
 
This  time  however,  correction  process  is  probabilistic  as  
each active  Boolean  function  almost  always  (except  for  input 
differences (0, 1, 1) for Ch and (1, 1, 1) for M aj) introduces a 
factor of 1/2. A detailed analysis of these probabilities is 
presented in Table 3.  
 
 
After multiplication of all factors, we obtain a probability for a 
successful correction equal to 2−84. Further optimisation are also 
possible  as  we  can  choose  messages  in  such  a  way  that 
conditions  for  successful  correction  will  be  always  satisfied  
for the  first 16  steps,  what  could  increase  the  probability  to  
around 2−64. This shows that the use of substitution boxes σ0, 
σ1and Σ0, Σ1is  essential  for  the  security  of  SHA-256  and  also 
demonstrates that mixing only modular additions with Boolean 
functions  is  not  enough  for  constructing a  secure  hash 
function.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 V .THE ROLE OF S-BOXES 
 
The substitution boxes Σ0 and Σ1 constitute the essential 
part  of  the  hash  function  and  fulfil  two  tasks:  they  add  
bit diffusion and destroy the ADD-linearity of the function.   
 
There are modular differentials for Σ0and Σ1that hold for one bit 
input difference e with probability 2−3(necessary  for  S-boxes 
used  in  steps i+ ,i + 5 and  with  probability  around 2−10 for 
input  difference  equal to Σ0(e) (used  for  Σ1in  step i+ 2). using  
the  approach of modular differences  it  is  possible to obtain  a  
corrective pattern for  the  complete  round structure with  
probability around  2−42.A  better  result  of 2−39 was obtained 
by Hawkes etal [HPR04] by explicit computation of  modular  
differences  for Σ0and Σ1,rather  than approximating them with a 
constant differential. 
 
The S-boxes σ0     and σ1   play a similar role: they provide 
non linearity and better diffusion for the message expansion. 
 
These  two  properties  of  the  message  expansion  constitute  
the foundation  of  the  security  of  the  full  SHA-256,  as  in  
order  to apply  corrective  patterns  in  a  straightforward  way,  
one  would need  at  least  37  expanded  words  equal  to  zero  
(since at  most three corrective patterns can be applied). 
Although this seems to be unlikely, further research is needed 
in this direction. In  the  rest  of  this  section,  we  concentrate  
on  the  message expansion and list some interesting properties 
of it:  
 
•  σ0 and  σ1  have  both  the  property  to  increase  the hamming 
weight  of  low-weight inputs.  This  increase  is  upper bounded  
by  a  factor  of  3.  The  average  increase  if Hamming  weight  
for  low-weight  inputs  is  even  higher if  three  rotations  are  
used  instead  of  two  rotations  and one  bit-shift.  However, a 
reason for this bit-shift is given by the next observation.  
 
• In contrast  to  all  other  members  of  the  MD4-family  
including  SHA-1,  rotating  expanded  message  words  to get  
new  expanded  message  words  is  not  possible anymore  
(even  in  the  XOR-  linearised  case).  This is due to the bit-
shift being used in σ0and σ1.  
 
VI.   FINDING LOW-WEIGHT CODE WORDS IN THE 
CODE DESCRIBING THE XOR- LINEARISED SHA-256 
MESSAGE EXPANSION 
 
In  the  first  attempt  to  get  an  idea  about  the  effect  of  all  
the changes  between  the  SHA-1  message  expansion  and  the 
SHA-256 message expansion, we consider single bit differences. 
Table 4 illustrates this comparison. We consider variants  
reduced to 40  steps  as  well  as  full  variants  (80 steps  for  
SHA-1  variants and 64  steps  for  SHA-256 variants).  
 
By the  modified  SHA-1 message  expansion  we refer  to  a  
variant  where  every  XOR  is  replaced  by  an addition  
modulo 232. By the modified  SHA-256 message  expansion,  we  
refer  to  a  variant  where  every addition  is  replaced  by  an  
XOR. We observe  that  both  the introduction  of  modular  
additions  and  the  replacement  of  a single bit-shift by a 
structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Comparison of the number of affected bits for a single  
 
bit difference  in  various  message  expansions.  In variants 
using modular addition, we used the all-zero vector as a starting 
point. using σ0 and σ1 heavily  increases  the  number  of  
affected bits in the expanded message.  
 
When talking about the SHA-1 message expansion, it was 
already observed in the works [MP05, RO05] that weights 
much smaller than 107 (as given in Table 4) can be found. The 
minimum weight found for the message expansion of SHA-1 is 
44. A more recent treatment of low-weight disturbance patterns 
in SHA-1 can be found in [JP05].  
 
Due  to  the  nonlinear  behaviour  of  the  modular  addition,  
no linear  code  can  describe  the  SHA-256  message  
expansion. However, if the modular addition is replaced by 
XOR, a linear code over Z2 can be constructed. If we consider 
SHA-256 with N steps, this code can be represented by a 512 × 
32N generator matrix.G.  
 
Due to the XOR-linearisation, every possible difference of two 
expanded words is also a valid word in this code. Therefore, 
probabilistic  algorithms  from  coding  theory  [Leo88,  Ste89, 
CC98] can be used to find low-weight differences for the XOR-
linearised  SHA-256  message  expansion. some results  of  this 
codeword search are depicted in Figure 2. All minimum 
weights found  for  variants  of  the  message  expansion  up  to  
the  full  64 steps are  shown  in  the  figure.  Until the 42-step 
variant, our algorithms found reasonable low weights.  This is 
depicted by the solid line. Considering the 40-step variant, the 
weight of 26 is  low  compared  to  a  minimal  weight  of  110  
for  single-bit differences given in Table 4. The 40-step 
expanded message is given in Table 5.  
 
For  variants  with  more  than  42  steps,  the  running  time  of  
our algorithms is currently too high to return reasonable low 
weights. The sudden jump after step 42 is not an intrinsic 
property of the SHA-256 message expansion, but rather the 
result of the limited running time of our algorithms.  
 
To show that there indeed are low-weight words for N > 42, we 
proceed as follows. After obtaining a low-weight word for 42 
steps we use the expansion process to extend it to the full length 
word.  weights obtained  in  this way  are  depicted  by  the  
dashed line.  
 
A  42-step  word  of  weight  35  is  used  there  as  a  starting 
point. Expanding it to 64 steps gives us a weight of 356. This is 
considerable lower than 467, which is the minimal weight given 
for a single bit difference in Table 4.  
 
However, there is room for improvements.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Hamming weights of low-weight words found for step-reduced 
variants of the XOR- linearised SHA-256 message expansion. 
 
In contrast to the words found for the SHA-1 message 
expansion, there  are  no  zero  bands  [RO05]  any  more.  Note 
that the given expanded message is not necessarily a valid 
difference in case of the real message expansion since we 
approximate the modular addition by the bitwise XOR operation. 
Also note that the given vector cannot directly  
be used as a collision-producing disturbance pattern as 
described by Chabaud and Joux in their original attack on SHA-
0 [CJ98]. The  reason is that  there are truncated  local 
collisions [CJ98] generated by non-zero words in the backward 
expansion.These local collisions start before step 0 and would 
cause additional difficulties for constructing a collision-
producing differential characteristic. However, we expect to find 
input words for reduced variants of the message expansion that 
can be used to build a collision-producing difference.  
 
A  number  of  conditions  on  chaining  variables  need  to  be 
satisfied  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  concatenation  of  
local  collisions (which hold with a probability between 
2−39and 2−42) results  in  a  collision  of  the  output  of  the  
compression function.  If  we  do  not  assume  any  pre-fulfilled  
conditions,  the  maximal  weight  we  allow  for  a  perturbation  
pattern  is  3  (since 2−39·4<  2−128). Considering the weights 
in Figure 2, this would mean a maximum of 24 steps 
 
 
 
VII CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we presented methods for finding collisions for two 
simplified variants of SHA-256, one fully linearised with 
respect to  the  modular  addition  and  the  other  one  with  all  the  S-
Boxes replaced  by  the  identity  function.  These  results  show  
that  the  presence  of  S-Boxes  is  essential  for  the  security  
of  SHA-256. We studied properties of the message   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expansion and presented expanded messages with low 
Hamming weights for the XOR- linearised message expansion 
of SHA-256. The  general  ideas  of  all  these  results  apply  
also  to  other members of the SHA-2 family.  
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